Tuesday, March 18, 2008

Bulter: Chap 3, part III and IV, and Conclusion

Where to begin...

III.
In this section Butler lays out Wittig’s arguments and then proceeds to destroy them en masse. Still, Butler walks away having gained some insight with Wittig’s arguments. Butler analyzes Wittig in light of Beauvoir’s assertion that sex is “factic” and that gender is gained later on. Wittiq believes that sex, like gender is also acquired (153). Wittig sees sex as something that is politically thrust upon women, and that women become “ontologically suffused with sex” (154). With sex, because we start to see it as intrinsically “there” rather than perpetuated by a social system, it’s hard to notice how sex is created rather than just experienced.

“’Sex’ the category, compels ‘sex,’ the social configuration of bodies, through what Wittig calls a coerced contract. Hence, the category of ‘sex’ is one that enslaves” (157). This forced contract, as represented by heterosexism (?) fails to provide those outside the system with a “voice.” To speak is to take part in the discourse in which you don’t fit (158-9). A predicament to say the least. Butler starts to depart from Wittig at this point. Wittig starts to argue, in Butler’s eyes, for the lesbianizing (163) of the world. Butler’s issue with this is that such a process to achieve a universal point of view would assert a compulsory effect similar to the coercive heterosexual contract that Wittiq criticizes. Wittig feels that only a radical departure from the heterosexual will be able to rid us of the heterosexual regime (164). Butler disagrees... “Further, Wittig’s radical disjunction between straight and gay replicates the kind of disjunctive binarism that she herself characterizes as the divisive philosophical gesture of the straight mind” (165). Not only can homosexual relationships represent some of the inherent problems with the “heterosexual contract,” but also, Butler feels the force of the heterosexual regime is “not the only way it operates” (166). This approach relies to heavily on the “very terms that lesbianism purports to transcend” (169) and that Wittig’s lesbianism discourages a solidarity with heterosexual women (173).

IV.
In this section, Butler explains the effects of inscribing gender (or maybe sex, too) on the body—something I can’t claim to fully understand after reading. As such, my description here will be short. Butler states that, at least for Foucault, “cultural values emerge as a result of inscription on the body” (177). Butler connects this to Douglas’ discussion of taboos. From my perspective, this section can be described by an excerpt on page 186 when Butler brings the discussed arguments back to the sphere of gender:

“If the inner truth of gender is a fabrication and if a true gender is a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies, then it seems that genders can be neither true nor false, but are only produced as the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity.”

The notion of gender being “neither true nor false” helps introduce Butler’s next topic: drag. We see on the following page (187) how drag, or the act of performing gender outside of one’s anatomical sex is representative of three dimensions: gender performance, gender identity, and anatomical sex. The three sets of dissonance (187) shows how “in imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as it’s contingency” (187). If performance, then gender cannot be based on a preexisting attribute or act (192), indeed Butler concludes, “gender can be neither true nor false, neither real nor apparent, neither original nor derived” (193).

Conclusion:
We’re brought all the way back to how Butler opened her book. Which, I must say, is probably the best way to conclude. The feminist’s claim of solidarity among all women is a “phantasmatic construction” (194); so too is the “real” and the “sexually factic” (199). I’m likely to agree with Butler here. She sees how feminists have limited themselves with the identities that they tried to use to “open up” discourse (200-1). “The internal paradox of foundationalism is that it presumes, fixes, and constrains the very ‘subjects’ that it hopes to represent and liberate” (203).



So where do we go from here? What is the next step for feminists? Or on an even smaller scale, how do we approach the subject as a class dedicated to discussing gender? By knowing our limitations, which Butler has spelled out many times, we should be able to start to fix them—Or do we replace them entirely?

Friday, March 7, 2008

Girls want sex, boys want love

Allen center’s her article on Foucault’s assertion that whenever there is power, there is the potential for resistance (216). She develops the traditional model of heterosexuality of the New Zealand population, referring to this model as the perceived “’real’ sex” (217) Explaining that sex, like we’ve discussed in the past, is often seen as a power dynamic. Allen stresses how these roles have affected the discourse on sex and relationships among teens, age 17-19. One party, primarily the male, is seen as the active participant where the other party, usually represented by the female partner, represents the passive role. She sees this passive/active model, reflected in the New Zealand understand (partly through literature), as contributing to the perceived differences between men and women’s sexual preferences, saying:

This “construction of women and men’s sexuality is dichotomized, with women lacking erotic desire, voyeuristic tendencies and corporeal pleasure, while men are disconnected from their emotional and mental needs and desires” (218).

Allen’s study is separated into four parts: Young women and the dominant discourse of sexual behavior (passive) and young women resisting dominant discourse, and men’s discourse of dominant sexual behavior (active) and the men resisting dominant discourse.

First, Allen explains the common assertions of female sexuality. This mostly focuses on how women are “positioned as the (reluctant) recipients of male desires rather than initiators of sexual activity” (220). The “recipient” role leads to more talk about desiring love in a relationship rather than sex. A few women, or “minority” (221), resist the prescribed sexuality in favor of something more balanced, though still flawed. Allen mentions how the likelihood of their resistance may be related to exposure to the “alternative pedagogies”(221). Even though they were resisting, the women felt a need to accommodate the dominating practices, as represented by the sexual double standard (slut label). In some cases the resistance reversed the masculine and feminine roles, making the woman the dominant sexual partner. Even so, the result still focused on the active/passive sexual interplay rather than a more equal role. The women also, when describing sex, tried to emphasize the importance of a balance of physical and emotional needs (223), but did not really talk about experiencing a willing sex-only relationship.

Men also tended to identify with the dominant discourse of “male sexuality as perpetually ready for sex, virile and potent” (225). Allen considers this masculine identity as one of social experience and “to achieve full masculine status young men must separate themselves from homosexual and feminine identities” (226). The men that resisted the dominant discourse referred to sex as something that wasn’t the “most” important, but failed to see sex as something unimportant. Interestingly, both sexes appeared to be more open to resisting when in a “safe” environment. The ‘safe’-ness is defined differently for each sex, men in more of a one on one environment and women in a female-dominated environment. Also, both sexes had a tendency to both accommodate and resist the dominant discourse.

Judging by her results during her project, Allen’s conclusion suggests that the dominant view of sexuality is outdated (231). She sees experience as a catalyst for changing mentalities. Often she cites men’s experience in relationships or women’s experience with exposure to alternative forms of sexual discussion as a means of introducing resistant tendencies. I feel that Allen makes a good point here. I think that, without exposure, people are likely to not know what options are available for them to choose from. I’m not sure if I’ll agree entirely, however. Exposure alone may not be enough. In a sex education setting, as she mentions in her opening paragraphs, exposure can be extremely beneficial. Within the private sphere, I feel, exposure is unlikely to have much of an impact—it may even have an adverse effect, closing off potential expressions of sexuality.

I was curious why Allen looked to teens to discover how sex is discussed. Perhaps because she associates the dominant discourse as “outdated” she felt that older individuals would be less likely to reflect contemporary feelings toward sex. Maybe she feels that sex, or at least exploratory discussion about sex is the realm of the young while older people may have already determined where they stand on the issues. Certainly sex is a new and exciting thing in their lives (if it’s even present), but what do teens bring to the discussion?


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Sorry this is late. I thought I was writing for monday.